ABSTRACT A range-reduced static definition-use (def-use) fault detection framework is proposed to improve the scalability, but still retain its accuracy, when applied to large application programs. It casts common faults, such as null pointer dereferences, undefined references, buffer overflows, and memory leaks into a common def-use fault pattern, and uses a two-level path-insensitive approach to classify variable uses that can trigger faults into must-trigger, must-not-trigger, and may-trigger categories depending on whether the unsafe uses can actually be, never be, or may be executed. For those must-trigger unsafe uses, faults are immediately reported, and those must-not-trigger uses are dropped from further analysis. The already reduced program range that is relevant to the may-trigger unsafe uses is further reduced by using a binary decision diagram encoded path extraction scheme for more accurate, but more expensive, path-sensitive analysis. A prototype has been built using this approach, and a set of large realistic applications (a total of more than 4.8 MLOC) was tested for such common types of def-use faults. Compared with existing popular path-sensitive detection tools such as Clang Static Analyzer, we find our approach incurs less analysis time, but achieves good accuracy with a low false positive rate and no false negative.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many common program faults, such as null pointer dereference (NPD), undefined reference (UDR), buffer overflow (BO), and memory leak (ML), are caused by unintended and/or unsafe definitions of certain variables. Such faults can lead to program vulnerability and even cause disastrous consequences. This kind of faults is commonly referred to as definition-use (def-use) faults because it is caused by assigning an unsafe value at a variable's definition site. As the assigned value flows through an execution path to the variable's use site, a fault will then be triggered. For a defuse fault, the use site is called a sink, and its corresponding definition site is called a source. Using static approaches, i.e. compile time approaches, to detect such faults accuracy and scalability is of primary concern when applied to very large application programs. However, achieving both accuracy and scalability is quite challenging as most existing techniques have shown.
For the accuracy-driven approaches, path-sensitive analysis is the primary technique used. They apply path-sensitive analysis inter-procedurally on the whole program, and solve the constraints along each control/execution path. The results are usually very accurate and sound. But for very large application programs with a large number of potential execution paths, their scalability suffers significantly. It may either take a very long time to complete the analysis, or simply fail to complete at all. In Saturn [1] , an accuracy-driven approach using path-sensitive techniques, it infers boolean satisfiability [2] on each execution path to detect faults. It could suffer long analysis time, and has a limitation when applied to very large application programs in practice.
For those approaches that are more scalability-driven, on-demand strategies are often used to significantly reduce the analysis time. For example, Clang Static Analyzer (Clang-SA) [3] is a fault detection tool used as a plug-in to the Clang compiler. It restricts its analysis to certain types of condition expressions on branches for scalability concern. But it may misdiagnose some infeasible paths as feasible, and produce many false positive results. In another example, Marple [4] tries to limit path-sensitive analysis to only the execution paths that contain potential faults. Using this approach, they can exclude many execution paths that are irrelevant to faults. But it applies path-sensitive analysis to all other paths, which can still be a very large number for large application programs. Many of those remaining paths can actually be analyzed by much less expensive approaches equally effective in fault detection.
For example, values from definition sites that are passed along all paths of a branch tree down to a use site located below the confluence of the branch tree will always (i.e. must) trigger an unsafe use. In this case, much less expensive pathinsensitive analysis can be equally effective and time saving, in particular for a very large branch tree. Hence, it is very important to distinguish among different program regions to apply either path-sensitive or path-insensitive analysis even after most irrelevant execution paths are excluded. We still need to avoid applying path-sensitive analysis as much as possible.
Another important consideration in fault detection is to adopt approaches that can fit well in existing compiler frameworks. Dataflow analysis is a general computation and propagation framework in most compilers. Instead of computing and propagating fault information outside of it, we should compute and propagate fault attribute (FA) values in it as much as possible. In our proposed approach, a fault attribute lattice (FAL) is introduced to facilitate this approach (see Fig.3 and Section II-C).
As more application programmers become more safety conscious, many build safeguards against potential faults in their programs. For example, they often check whether a pointer is NULL or not before dereferencing the pointer. This is usually done by guarding the pointer deference with some conditional statements with such a check. Hence, even though the pointer dereferencing could be unsafe (i.e. has a NULL value), but the fault will never be triggered. Similar cases exist in memory allocation, e.g. the program will return if a check shows that the memory allocation fails. The more robust the program is built, the more such safeguard statements exist. Interestingly, since such safeguard statements are placed by the programmers themselves, these safeguard statements have very limited and simple patterns that can be easily identified using simple pattern matching techniques. Existing def-use fault detection schemes often unnecessarily spend a lot of time analyzing such seemingly unsafe uses with little useful outcome, or report them as false positives.
To address both the accuracy and scalability problems, we propose a RARE (RAnge-REduced) framework with a two-level approach to select only a small subset of execution paths and program regions to apply expensive path-sensitive analysis (see Fig.2) . In the first level, we use a less expensive path-insensitive but comprehensive (i.e. it is flow-, field-, and context-sensitive) approach to classify sinks into safe, must-unsafe and may-unsafe categories. Based on the execution path and control flow, a sink is further identified as must-trigger, must-not-trigger or may-trigger depending on whether the use will definitely be executed and trigger a fault, will definitely not be executed and will not trigger a fault, or may be executed and may trigger a fault, respectively.
For sinks with a safety attribute of safe, they can be dropped for further analysis because they can never trigger a fault. For a must-unsafe sink (e.g. a pointer with a NULL value), if it will definitely be executed (i.e. it is in the must-trigger category), a fault can be immediately reported. For those mayunsafe sinks, if they have safeguard statements they are in the must-not-trigger category, and they can also be discarded for further analysis (Fig.2) .
For the remaining may-unsafe sinks that are in the maytrigger category further analysis is required. However, before performing path-sensitive analysis on these may-triggersinks, we use a binary decision diagram (BDD) [5] scheme to encode path conditions in a compressed way, and a prefix BDD string-based path extraction scheme to further reduce the program range needed for path-sensitive analysis (see Section III-C). Such a two-level approach for def-use fault detection can be easily adopted in an existing compiler to take advantage of the most recent advances in program analysis.
In this paper, we made the following contributions.
• We propose a two-level static def-use fault detection framework. To improve accuracy, it employs both comprehensive path-insensitive analysis and range-reduced path-sensitive analysis in a unified framework. For better scalability, it uses a two-level approach to narrow the range to only a small subset of execution paths and program regions for applying path-sensitive analysis.
• We built a prototype in Open64 [6] and experimented on a wide range of realistic programs (exceeds 4.8MLOC). It shows that our two-level strategy can reduce the scope of path-sensitive analysis to a much smaller range than existing approaches. Compared to other path-sensitive tools such as Clang-SA [1] , our approach shows significantly lower false positives and fewer false negatives with faster analysis time. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the def-use fault detection problems this paper intends to address. In Section III, our fault detection framework and its implementation are described in detail. Section IV shows the experimental environment, benchmarks, experimental data, fault detection results and some analysis. Section V discusses the related work. And finally, in Section VI, we conclude the paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT A. EXPLICIT AND NON-EXPLICIT DEF-USE FAULTS
The cause of all def-use faults stems from unsafe definitions early in the execution paths. To detect such faults, the uses of the variables that may trigger such faults need to be analyzed. We call the variables that are relevant to def-use faults characteristic variables. For example, in the detection of VOLUME 6, 2018 null pointer deference (NPD) and memory leak (ML) faults, the characteristic variables are the pointer variables that are involved in NPD and ML faults. Whereas for undefined reference (UDR) faults, characteristic variables may include all program variables along the execution paths. In our work, we classify def-use faults into the following two categories. Both are handled in the same fault detection framework.
1) EXPLICIT DEF-USE FAULTS
The typical def-use faults in this category include NPD and buffer overflow (BO) faults. They have very explicit faulty uses. For example, when a pointer dereference (a use site) encounters a NULL value that is assigned earlier, a NPD fault is triggered. Similarly, when an out-of-range value is assigned to a buffer index variable, a BO fault is triggered when it is used later on.
2) NON-EXPLICIT DEF-USE FAULTS
The typical def-use faults in this category include ML and UDR faults. This kind of faults does not have an explicit Fig.2 ).
• Safe: No fault will be reported.
• Must-Unsafe: It marks the use site as a must-trigger sink, and report the fault.
• May-Unsafe: If there are guard statements at the use site, it will change the safety attribute frommay-unsafe to safe, and mark it as a must-not-trigger sink. No fault will be reported. For other cases, it is marked as maytrigger and requires further determination by the later path-sensitive analysis. Fig.1 shows an example that involves intra-procedural and inter-procedural fault attribute computation and propagation.
1) INTRA-PROCEDURAL FA VALUE COMPUTATION
Path-insensitive FA value computation and propagation is performed during dataflow computation and propagation.
(1) For a branch statement, we perform a meet operation at the branch confluence point, similar to the phi operation in the static single assignment (SSA) [7] . That is, if the FA values from all branches are safe, then the use site is safe, same for the unsafe case. Otherwise, the use site is may-unsafe. For the may-unsafe case, we need to determine whether the use site will be executed or not. If it will never be executed, e.g. it has guard statements, it is in themust-not-trigger category and no fault will be reported. Otherwise, it is in the may-trigger category and requires the path-sensitive analysis later.
(2) For a loop, we perform a limited loop unrolling, i.e. we iterate a few times. It is a quick-and-dirty but effective approach because in most cases, the FA values can be determined during the limited loop unrolling, for instance, from NULL to NOTNULL or MAYNULL. The case of transforming from NOTNULL or MAYNULL to NULL is rare.
In Fig.1 (b), a branch confluence operation is performed at the definition site of p at line 23, which merges NULL and NOTNULL to a FA value of MAYNULL. In addition, since there exists a safeguard statement at line 22, even if the definition of p is unsafe, it still cannot reach the use site at line 23. We can thus transition its FA value from MAYNULL to NOTNULL at line 23.
2) INTER-PROCEDURAL FA VALUE COMPUTATION
The FA computation at a call site is context-sensitive. That is, different call sites may have different fault behavior. The example illustrated in Fig.1(c) shows the difference between the call site at line 18 and that at line 20 of function boo(). The result at line 18 is safe, and is may-unsafe at line 20.
C. FAULT ATTRIBUTE LATTICE
To allow it to fit in the same dataflow infrastructure in a compiler, we transform the fault detection problem to a FA computation and propagation problem. To describe the fault attributes and their computation rules, we introduce the Fault Attribute Lattice (FAL), which models a FA value as a node in FAL. The FA transition rules are modeled as the operations on FAL. A more formal definition of FAL and its operations are presented in Section III-A-1.
D. REDUCING PROGRAM RANGE FOR PATH-SENSITIVE ANALYSIS AND FAULT DETECTION
To mitigate the impact of the high cost in more accurate analyses, we use a two-level approach to reduce the program range (i.e. the code regions with the relevant execution paths) using low-overhead analysis approaches.
1) FIRST-LEVEL PROGRAM RANGE REDUCTION
The first-level program range reduction is performed through sink classification during FA value computation and propagation. In this phase, whenever a use site acquires a safe FA value, it is dropped from further analysis. If it has an unsafe FA value, it is further determined whether it is mustunsafe or a may-unsafe. If it is must-unsafe, it is grouped into the must-trigger category and reported as a fault. If it is mayunsafe, then a later path-sensitive analysis may be required to determine whether it is safe or must-unsafe.
As mentioned earlier, to identify those use sites with safeguard statements and eliminate them from further pathsensitive analysis, we collect a small set of code templates that have some common safeguarded program patterns. We use a very low cost heuristic pattern matching approach to identify such safe-guarded use sites, and change their safety attribute from may-unsafe to safe. They are dropped from further analysis. It is noteworthy that although such an engineering approach appears to be ad hoc, it is quite effective in practice in reducing the program range. It is because application programmers usually make them very simple and easy to identify for easy maintenance. As more and more application programmers are using such safeguard statements to improve the robustness of their programs, more such code regions can be dropped for further analysis.
The may-unsafe sinks are further classified into either must-not-trigger or may-trigger category. The group of maytrigger sinks and their execution paths form the initial reduced program range for later path-sensitive analysis.
2) SECOND-LEVEL PROGRAM RANGE REDUCTION
To further reduce the program range produced in the firstlevel, we extract all paths that propagate the unsafe attribute to each may-trigger sink because they are the paths that can potentially trigger a fault at the sink. Whether a path propagates a safe or an unsafe attribute to a sink depends on the safety attribute of its last definition along the path. Note that from an unsafe source down to amay-safe sink with a may-triggerattribute, there could be many paths between them. There may be definitions with the safe attribute that override them, and be propagated to the may-trigger sink. It will change the sink's safety attribute to safe, and thus be removed from further path-sensitive analysis.
To facilitate such an analysis, our approach is to encode those paths between an unsafe definition and a maytriggersink with a binary decision diagram (BDD) type of encoding scheme. That is, each path will propagate an encoded BDD string that records all branch directions (i.e. true branch or false branch) along the path. Source definitions and may-trigger sinks also carries such a BDD string. The last definition on the path that impacts the safety attribute of the sink must be the definition whose BDD string is the longest among all definitions' BDD strings reaching this sink (see Section III-C-2 for more details).
III. THE RARE FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe the formal models, heuristic approaches, and the major components in our framework shown in Fig.2 . There are three major components: (1) firstlevel range reduction, (2) second-level range reduction, and (3) path-sensitive analysis and fault detection.
A. FORMAL MODELS AND APPROACHES 1) FAULT ATTRIBUTE LATTICE (FAL)
A fault attribute lattice (FAL) is an algebra system with three components: V FAL , F intersection , and F union , denoted as:
The three components, V FAL , F intersection , and F union are defined as follows.
, that support a particular type of def-use fault detection. For example, for NPD faults, they are NULL, NOTNULL and MAYNULL (see Fig.3(a) ). ⊥ ∈ V FAL represents the initial FA values (shown as TOP), whereas represents the detected FA value that will be reported (denoted as BOTTOM). FA values are carried by characteristic variables and are modeled as lattice values at the FAL nodes.
The transition rules of FA values are mapped to the lattice operations, which are defined through
NPD(see the edges from NULL, NOTNULL to MAYNULLin Fig.3(a) ), or F intersection ( MALLOC, FIRST-FREE) = MAYFREE in ML (see Fig.3(b) ). We perform F intersection at the confluence of branches (see Section III-B-1). In our algorithm, the FA values will be iteratively modified until a final FA value is reached, which has been proved to always terminate on a lattice with a limited height [8] . A Hasse diagram [9] is a commonly used graphical representation for such lattices. The Hasse diagrams that represent the FALs of the two common def-use faults: NPD and ML are shown in Fig.3 .
2) TRIGGER-RELEVANT CONTROL-FLOW GRAPH (TR-CFG)
Given a sink of a characteristic variable v, denoted as USE(v), the fault detection analysis needs the following information: 1) the definitions of v, denoted as the set DEFs (v) , that can reach the USE(v) through some control-flow paths; 2) USE(v) itself; and 3) the control-flow paths from DEFs(v) to USE (v) . A sub-graph of the control-flow graph (CFG) that consists of the above three components is called a Trigger-Relevant
is used to analyze the triggering scenarios of v. It is also used in the heuristic must-not-triggerpattern matching for the safeguarded sinks and the BDD-style path extraction scheme described in Section III-C-2.
3) HEURISTIC CODE PATTERN MATCHING
For may-unsafe sinks, we further determine whether they aremust-not-triggersinks or not, e.g. with or without safeguard statements. If they are, exclude them from further analysis. Otherwise, group them as may-trigger sinks and pass them for second-level range reduction.
The work to determine whether a sink of variable v is amust-not-trigger sink is conducted on TR-CFG v with heuristic pattern matching. Two of the representative code patterns for safeguarded must-not-trigger sinks are shown in Fig.4 . .'' Although such simple pattern matching cannot find allmust-not-triggersinks with different patterns of safeguard statements, it is still quite effective in practice. In our experiments, it helps us to identify a large number ofmustnot-trigger sinks, and reduce the range of path-sensitive analysis substantially. More patterns can be included if needed. But we suspect there will be very few, as application programmers usually will not use complicated ''tricky'' safeguard statements for ease of program maintenance.
B. FIRST-LEVEL RANGE REDUCTION
First-level range reduction includes two parts: (1) aggressive FA value computation and propagation, and (2) sink classification, in particular, on must-not-trigger sinks.
1) AGGRESSIVE FA VALUE COMPUTATION AND PROPAGATION
A path-insensitive FA computation is first performed to classify the use sites into three categories according to their definitions' triggering attributes, i.e. safe, must-unsafe and may-unsafe. It includes inter-procedural context-sensitive FA values computation, and intra-procedural, flow-, fieldsensitive FA values computation.
a: INTER-PROCEDURAL, CONTEXT-SENSITIVE FA VALUE COMPUTATION ALGORITHM
To make the inter-procedural FA value computation more accurate, we group the input and output parameters of a function into Use_Ins and Def_Outs. When we inter-procedurally compute the FA values, the information of FA values is attached to the Use_Insand Def_Outs. We first traverse the call graph in a bottom-up manner. It computes a summary for each function using common intra-procedural summary computation algorithm. Here, the summary records whether the FA computation of local variables andDef_Outs depends on Use_Ins or not.
After the bottom-up computation, we then traverse the call graph in a top-down manner. For each function f visited, we perform the following tasks in a context-sensitive manner. 1) Map Use_In's FA value of f from the current caller; 2) instantiate f 's summary, and refresh the FA values according to the context it is in. Function pointers are taken into consideration by using the result from the pointer analysis when it constructs the call graph. To handle the case of recursive calls, we reduce the call graph to a Strongly Connected Directed Acyclic Graph (SCC-DAG). It then processes each function by traversing the SCC-DAG. 
Here, (x, y, z) denotes a computation of characteristic variable z's FA value from statement x whose statement type is y, e.g. an assignment or a call, as shown above in (1) and (2) In addition, we perform a F intersection operation at a branch's confluence point. For those statements that involve pointer operations, the point-to information is used to compute the FA values conservatively. We try to use a pointer analysis that is scalable and accurate. It helps us achieve overall scalability and accuracy.
The integrated framework of inter-and intra-procedural algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 1. Where FA(t,s1,s2 , . . . sm) computes t's FA value using s1, s2,. . . sm, m≥1. The intra-procedural algorithm FA_Val_CP has a polynomial time complexity. This is because the intra-procedural computation is monotonously upward [8] , and the iteration can be terminated within the height of FAL. For the interprocedural algorithm, the worst case is when each statement is a call statement, and summary re-computation is needed on every call site. The time complexity can be estimated to be O(h * n * n). It is close to O(n 2 ) as h is the height of FAL, which is a small constant, and n is the number of program statements.
2) SINK CLASSIFICATION
Sink classification is performed along with FA value computation and propagation, which also takes the safety attributes into consideration as shown in Algorithm 2.
For those must-unsafe sinks, we can also characterize them as must-triggersinks and report the faults (lines 3-5). For those may-unsafe sinks, the heuristic patterns matching 6-11) . The general strategy to identify must-not-trigger sinks is to check every dominator of a given sink towards its corresponding source in TR-CFG. The check only needs to be on the fault-related statements.
For example, for a sink that hold the safeguard statement such as ''if (< variable >==< unsafe value>)'' (see ''check unsafe condition'' in Fig.4 ), we will search whether there is a response action such as exitorfunction return or not. If the pattern matches, the current sink will be excluded from further consideration. Otherwise, it will be marked as a may-trigger sink for further analysis. Another example is for sinks that have safeguard statement such as ''if (<variable>!=<unsafe value>)'' (see ''check safe condition''and the response after the check in Fig.4 ), we search their dominators towards their corresponding sources in TR-CFG to see if such pattern matches. If we find such a match, they can also be excluded from further analysis.
The remaining sinks are automatically grouped intomaytrigger sinks category (lines [12] [13] [14] , and placed on the work list for second-level range reduction. The time 
C. SECOND-LEVEL RANGE REDUCTION
After the first-level range reduction, only the may-unsafe sinks with the may-trigger attribute remain to be further analyzed at the second-level. A naive approach will be to use program slicing techniques [10] to extract the statement set that is relevant to each may-trigger sink and its corresponding source, and apply path-sensitive analysis on them.
One common technique is to perform a backward slicing on a may-trigger sink first and get the statement set S BT ; followed by a forward slicing from an identified unsafe source to get the statement set S FS (assume the unsafe source is reachable). Then find the statement set S TS , which is the intersection of the sets S BT and S FS . S TS includes the statements on the execution paths between the source and the sink. The main drawback of such a slicing approach is that the collected execution paths not only include the unsafe paths but may also include many safe paths, which are not required to be further analyzed. To avoid such a problem, we use an extraction scheme that only extracts unsafe paths for the maytriggersinks identified in the first-level range reduction. It is based on Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) path encoding scheme. 
1) PATH CONDITION ENCODING USING BDD
We encode all branch outcomes (true or false) along an execution path in the style of BDD. The main encoding rules are listed in Table 1 . They consist of atom rules, multiplication rules and confluence rules specifically for our encoding purposes. More complex rules can be generated by a combination of the above basic rules. The result of a BDDencoding is called a BDD item, also denoted as BDD if there is no confusion.
In Table 1 , Bdd(b,v) denotes the BDD item when branch b takes the value of v,which can be eithertrueorfalse. For example, Bdd(branch, true) → 1 indicates using BDD item 1 to represent a true branch; PBdd(path) denotes the BDD item of a path, which can be a string of 0 and 1 that includes all the branch outcomes along the path; Conf(x1,x2) denotes the BDD item that is a concatenation of BDD itemsx1and x2 at the confluence of a branch. BDD items are attached to all sources, sinks, and branch conditions. In the example shown in Fig.5 , the source is attached with BDD ''0''; conditions T2, T5 are attached with BDD ''01'' and BDD ''0110 || 0101,'' respectively; Sink(2)'s BDD is ''01101 || 01011.''
2) PREFIX-MATCHED UNSAFE PATHS EXTRACTION
By performing a prefix analysis on a sink's BDD items, we can determine the order of the definitions on the path to the sink. This is because the last definition that assigns the value to the sink must have the longest BDD item among all other definitions along the same path. By combining all BDD items' safety attributes; the safety attribute of the sink can be determined.
For each may-trigger sink, we perform the following steps to extract unsafe paths (shown in Algorithm 3, whose time complexity is affected by the number of edges in the CFG). Step 1: Find all its sources inter-procedurally, perform BDD encoding related to each source, and attach the BDD items to its basic block.
Algorithm 3 Second-Level Range Reduction
Step 2: Sort all sources' BDD items in a descending order according to their lengths. Arrange them to form a worklist W defs for the may-trigger sink (lines 13).
Step 3: Collect all BDD items of this may-trigger sink to form set S sink_bdd (lines 14), then decide whether the corresponding path of each element in the set is safeor unsafe. Check the element s curr in S sink_bdd one by one (lines 15-26):
Step 4: For an unsafe definition def unsafe in W defs , if s curr takes def unsafe 's BDD as a prefix, then s curr is removed from S sink_bdd and added it to the unsafe path set P unsafe . Otherwise, select next item in S sink_bdd as s curr .
Step 5: For a safe definition def safe in W defs , if s curr takes def unsafe 's BDD as a prefix then exclude it from S sink_bdd .
Repeat Step 4 and Step 5 until S sink_bdd becomes an empty set , or all items in W defs have been processed.
For example, in Fig.5 , the final unsafe paths set P unsafe is {''01101,'' ''01100''}. There are 6 paths excluded from all 8 paths. It is a considerable reduction in the number of paths.
D. PATH-SENSITIVE ANALYSIS AND DETECTION
In our RARE framework, a potential fault is reported when (1) a must-trigger unsafesink is identified in the two-level range reduction phase, and (2) amay-trigger sink is confirmed to be unsafe along some feasible execution paths, i.e. it is confirmed to be a must-trigger after the path-sensitive analysis.
As the program range has been reduced substantially in the two-level range-reduction phase already (see Fig.7 ), in our current implementation, we use an existing path-sensitive analysis tool (such as Clang-SA) with the guide of our BDD information to check if an unsafe path is feasible for a mayunsafe sink or not. If it is actually a must-trigger unsafe sink, then report such a sink as a potential fault.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. PROTOTYPE AND BENCHMARKS
We implement our prototype in Open64 [6] , an open-source compiler with a very sophisticated analysis tool set. We also implement our path-sensitive analysis for the range-reduced may-trigger sinks using the enhanced BDD information as described in Section III in Clang-SA [1] . We also use more accurate and scalable pointer analysis LevPA [11] in our implementation. Our experimental platform is an AMD Opteron hex-core CPU server, with a clock rate of 2.11GHz, and a memory size of 48GB. All experiments are done in a single process environment to avoid interferences.
For benchmarks, we selected five open-source realistic applications: openssh [12] , sendmail [13] , httpd [14] , wine [15] and wireshark [16] . The benchmark set covers a wide spectrum of application areas such as network-level security enhancement tool, internet email routing facility, operating system compatibility-layer application and network protocol analysis. The total code size exceeds 4.8 million lines. The largest individual program wireshark has more than 2 million lines.
B. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 1) FIRST-LEVEL RANGE REDUCTION: SINK CLASSIFICATION RESULTS
One unique feature of RARE is its classification of potential fault statements into different types, and the use of different fault detection schemes with varying degrees of overheads tailored to each type. For must-triggerand mustnot-trigger sinks, we use a low overhead approach. Only for may-trigger sinks, we use a relative expensive path-sensitive approach. Consequently, the effectiveness of this approach is to a large extent dependent on the percentage of these three sink categories in a program.
Furthermore, note that the FA values of all def-use fault types (i.e. NPD, BO, ML, UDR faults) are computed and propagated at the same time during the fault analysis. However, ML and UDR are of non-explicit def-use types (see Section II-A), and only NPD and BO have explicit sources and sinks. Between the two, NPD has the most complicated and significant triggering characteristics. Thus, NPD fault detection constitutes the major portion of the overall def-use fault analysis time. We thus collect statistics based on NPD fault detection in our measurements. The percentages of three different sink categories for NPD faults in each benchmark are shown in Fig.6 . For most of our benchmark programs, the combined percentage of musttrigger and must-not-trigger sinksin each individual program exceeds 84%. Especially in openssh and wireshark, the percentage of must-not-trigger sinks alone is greater than 79%. Note that the number of the must-not-trigger sinks in wiresharkis very large (see Fig.6 ). It distorts the distribution in Fig.7 .
As mentioned before, the safeguard statements are very common and often required in large application in practice. It is particularly important to take such program characteristic into consideration when we try to reduce the number of maytrigger sinks and avoid too many false positives. 
2) SECOND-LEVEL RANGE REDUCTION: REDUCTION RATIO COMPARED TO SLICING-BASED APPROACHES
To compare the effectiveness of using a BDD-based scheme in the second level of our program range reduction, we use a program-slicing scheme based on [17] . It is very similar to the program slicing approach described in Section III-C. The results are shown in Table 3 . The average reduction ratios on program size using RARE and slicing-based strategy are 66% and 48%, respectively, i.e. we reduced additional 18% of program range on average compared to the program slicingbased approach.
3) DETECTION TIME AND MEMORY USAGE
The detection time of RARE consists of three major parts: (1) the time for the first-level range reduction; (2) the time for the second-level range reduction; and (3) the time for the path-sensitive analysis and fault detection after the two-level range reduction.
The results are shown in the 5 th column and 9 th columns (marked as 1st) in Table 4 for the first part (i.e. the firstlevel range reduction). It includes the time to detect the must-trigger sinks and to exclude the must-not-trigger sinks. The 6 th and 10 th (marked as 2nd) columns show the time for the second part (i.e. the second-level range reduction). It includes the time to extract unsafe path set (using a BDD-based approach) for eachmay-triggersink. The 7 th and 11 th columns (marked as PS) show the third part for the time that uses a path-sensitive analysis to determine the feasibility of the extracted unsafe paths and check whether a may-trigger sink is a fault or not. It is worth noting that the time for path feasibility determination will be greatly affected by the ability of third party tool, this is also the part for further improvement.
We compare our approach with Clang-SA, which uses a path-sensitive analysis on all execution paths and is available in popular Clang compiler. As shown in Table 4 , the analysis time in the first two parts, i.e. the two-level range reduction, is much less than that of using Clang-SA. Clang-SA requires exploring path feasible states. But it processes only simple cases. For example, Clang-SA ignores the condition expressions that consist of more than one variable. Even so, the required exploration space is still quite considerable for large application programs.
Currently, to simplify our implementation, we use Clang-SA in the third part to determine the feasibility of the extracted unsafe paths, and check whether a may-trigger sink is a fault or not. Its time is shown in the columns under PS. It shows significant reduction in time compared to Clang-SA due to the reduced range. However, the total fault detection time of RARE shown in the 8 th and 12 th columns under Total is impacted somewhat by the implementation of Clang-SA. Nevertheless, the total detection time shown in the last row of Table 4 still shows (5294-4362)/5294 = 17.6% improvement for NPD, and (5879-4755)/5879 = 23.6% improvement for ML over Clang-SA.
The memory usage by RARE is mostly determined by the program analysis, in particular the pointer analysis, and the two-level range reduction. It varies in different phases. In general, pointer analysis is the most memory consuming because it needs to keep a large amount of pointer analysis information. Whereas the space overhead of FA value computation and propagation is relatively small because it only keeps the fault attribute values. Our BDD encoding and unsafe path extraction also uses less memory space compared to that used in program slicing approaches. It generally uses less memory space than that used in pointer analysis. Taking the largest benchmark wireshark as an example, the average memory usage is only about 2300 MB. Table 5 shows the NPD and ML detection results by Clang-SA and RARE. In Table 5 , #FR denotes the total number of faults reported. It includes both the truefaults and the false positives. #FP denotes the number of false positives after we manually check each of the reported faults. #RFN denotes the number of false negatives. As there is no golden standard for the benchmarks we used, we collect all of the true faults (verified manually) reported by both RARE and Clang-SA. The number of false negatives #RFN is obtained by comparing the detected true faults in each approach against the combined set of all true faults.
4) DETECTION ACCURACY
For Clang-SA, the loss of detection accuracy is mainly caused by two factors. One is that it does not check safeguarded statements for must-not-triggersinks. This results in many false positives. For example, many false positives in wireshark, httpd, and sendmail are in this category. It is also true for many false positives ML faults in openssh. Another reason is that it often treats infeasible paths as feasible because it can only handle limited forms of branch conditions. In comparison, RARE reduced about 66% of false positives. It plays an important role in improved detection accuracy.
In Table 5 , we also show the false positive ratio R FP = (#FR -#DTF) / #FR, in which #DTF is the number of detected true faults in each approach. It shows the percentage of true faults detected in each approach. We also show the false negative ratio R RFN = (#TF − #DTF)/#TF, in which #TF is the total number of true faults detected from both RARE and Clang-SA as explained earlier.
We found that the R FP of Clang-SA for NPD and ML are about 54% and 38%, respectively, which are quite high. This shows that our approach of combining two-level range reduction, BDD-based path extraction scheme and checking of safeguard statements are quite effective. Furthermore, the average R RFN for ML faults in Clang-SA reaches to a high of 96%. It is distorted by the results from wine and wireshark. It is mostly due to poor inter-procedural analysis and wrapper function identification.
In summary, the average false positive ratio of RARE is 16% (NPD) and 10% (ML), respectively, which is about a third of Clang-SA's. There is also no false negative on the known faults by RARE. We found that RARE's high detection accuracy is also due to the following two factors. 1) It eliminates many false positives through the identification of must-not-trigger patterns (many from identifying safeguard statements). 2) It uses highly accurate program analysis such as the inter-procedural pointer analysis done by LevPA [11] .
V. RELATED WORK PATH-INSENSITIVE DETECTION
Splint [18] is a path-insensitive annotation-assisted static detection tool that performs detection very quickly but with lots of false positives. FindBugs [19] is also a representative path-insensitive detection tool that employed dataflow analysis in bug finding in Java code. It suffers the accuracy problems like other path-insensitive detection approaches.
PATH-SENSITIVE DETECTION
Saturn [2] , [20] is an accurate path-sensitive analysis and detection framework. It transforms the program constructs into boolean constraints, and use a boolean satisfiability (SAT) solver to infer and check faults. But since it exhaustively checks all execution paths one by one, the overhead is very large for large programs. Clang-SA [1] is also a path-sensitive detection tool. To handle the scalability problem, it only performs intra-procedural path-sensitive analysis and restricts the types of path condition expressions it can process to reduce the overhead. The restrictions often resulted in a big loss in detection accuracy. Marple [4] employs a demand-driven path-sensitive approach for scalability. It first finds all potentially faulty statements in a program, and then examines paths from each potentially faulty statement to the program entry and see whether a fault occurs or not. This is supported by some security policies and queries about faults. Marple only excludes the fault-unrelated paths. There could still be a large number of fault-related paths left unanalyzed.
FLOW-BASED DETECTION
Parfait [21] is a static layered program analysis detection framework developed by Sun Microsystems. It uses a simple program analysis technique with low overhead to analyze easy to detect faults, and only does expensive program analysis on complicated faults. The program analysis involved in Parfait includes constant propagation, partial evaluation and symbolic analysis etc. SABER [22] performs fault detection based on a full-sparse value-flow analysis. It reasons about the path conditions guarding the flow of a value only on the relevant parts instead of the entire CFG. But it requires building sparse value-flow graph. It is primarily for memory leak faults.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a range-reduced two-level def-use fault detection framework, which takes fault triggering characteristics into consideration, leveraging path-insensitive and path-sensitive analysis on different fault triggering scenarios. Using such an approach both accuracy and scalability for large application programs can be successfully addressed. Such an approach can also fit quite well in the dataflow framework in exiting compilers. Our experimental results on more than 4.8 million lines of code (MLOC) in some large applications in practice demonstrate that such an approach is quite scalable and accurate. 
